Keep your attack engine. Add the context and evidence plane.
Feed supported adversarial findings, attack traces, runtime observations, or chain candidates into the SecEng OEM Engine. Add gray-box context across code, agents, RAG, MCP, tools, identities, permissions, and consequential actions - then use APC to qualify what is grounded, keep inference explicit, independently challenge the path, and identify the controls that break the most meaningful chains.
Three signals from the partner integration
The first conversation should establish whether the partner already has the attack engine, the evidence, and the operating model. SecEng adds the context plane around it.
Bring your own attacks
Use supported findings, traces, reproduced behaviors, runtime observations, or attack-path candidates as bounded SecEng evidence inputs.
- Partner adversarial evidence
- Target/session metadata
- Runtime observations
- Chain candidates
Gray-box uplift
Add code, agent, MCP, identity, permission, retrieval, and authority context when deeper system visibility is available.
- Code paths
- Prompts and retrieval
- Agent topology
- Authority boundaries
Evidence-qualified paths
Separate observed and grounded steps from explicit inference, independently challenge the chain, and rank shared remediation chokepoints.
- Grounded vs inferred labels
- Independent validation
- ATT&CK mapping
- Chokepoint ranking
Choose the specialization that matches your primary commercial motion.
This route is for platforms that already generate adversarial evidence. If your need is different, the other partner lanes are narrower and more accurate.
Scanner / AppSec product
Primary need is AI-native scanner findings and optional APC enrichment.
Broad technology integration
Primary need is integration into AppSec, DevSecOps, GRC, cloud, and security workflows.
Managed customer delivery
Primary need is a managed service motion with customer-org controls and reporting.
Generic modular OEM
Primary need is to embed selected SecEng capabilities without a platform specialization.
Your attack engine already does the hard part.
Offensive-security platforms increasingly generate adaptive attacks, reproduce exploitable behavior, reconstruct multi-step campaigns, and capture runtime evidence. SecEng does not need to replace that engine to add value.
Partner attack intelligence
What the partner may already provide as attack evidence.
- Adversarial campaign results
- Reproduced failures
- Attack traces
- Attack-chain candidates
- Runtime observations
- Framework or taxonomy mappings
- Target and session metadata
- Remediation findings
SecEng system context
Where available and authorized, SecEng can add structural context around the attacked system.
- Code-derived paths
- Prompts and retrieval
- Agent topology
- MCP and tool relationships
- Identity and permission context
- Approval boundaries
- Data relationships
- Consequential sinks and actions
APC qualification
Use the combined evidence to qualify, not replace, the partner's findings.
- Construct grounded attack clusters
- Preserve evidence provenance
- Separate grounding from inference
- Challenge sequence assumptions independently
- Correlate ATT&CK behavior
- Identify cross-chain chokepoints
Partner-native return
Return supported structured intelligence to the partner for native rendering and workflow use.
- Attack-path objects
- Evidence references
- Validation state
- Grounding and inference labels
- ATT&CK mappings
- Remediation context
- Retest state
- Other agreed structured outputs
Exact inputs are defined by the integration contract; SecEng does not require every input type.
Black-box evidence. Gray-box context when it adds signal.
A partner does not need source access to start. Observed adversarial behavior can stand as valuable evidence on its own.
Bring your attack engine. Add SecEng downstream or alongside it.
The partner remains the system of engagement. SecEng supplies selected specialist analysis behind the scenes.
- Was the path better grounded?
- Did context add material information?
- Did independent validation catch weak assumptions?
- Did chokepoint analysis improve prioritization?
- Can the output live inside the partner product?
Evidence-qualified attack paths, not a competing attack engine.
Attack Path Chaining (APC) is designed to reason over supported evidence, not replace the platform that generated it.
01 · Grounded core
Build only from company- or system-specific evidence: supported partner findings, reproduced behavior, traces, runtime evidence, CVEs, code paths, exposed-credential evidence where appropriate, authority relationships, and other supported security intelligence. Every grounded step must trace to evidence and a supported ATT&CK mapping.
02 · Precedent-backed extensions
Where direct evidence ends, model clearly labeled earlier or later TTP hypotheses using supported real-world adversary sequencing. Inference never becomes a grounded finding.
03 · Independent validation
Separate validators challenge evidence grounding, ATT&CK mapping, sequence plausibility, and unsupported assumptions before the chain advances.
04 · Break the chain
Identify controls and boundaries that collapse the greatest number of meaningful paths. Where supported, connect validated chains to remediation chokepoints, D3FEND mappings, retest conditions, FAIR-aligned risk reasoning, and evidence / review state.
APC performs defensive attack-path analysis at the tactic-technique-procedure level. It does not generate exploit code, payloads, credential material, or step-by-step intrusion instructions.
Attack generation and attack-path qualification answer different questions.
The layers can overlap. The purpose of the pilot is to measure whether SecEng contributes material context or evidence intelligence beyond what the partner already produces - not to force an artificial architecture onto a mature product.
Prove the integration on a real partner attack path.
Start with a bounded attack or campaign the partner already understands. Compare the original result with the SecEng-enriched result and determine whether the additional context, evidence qualification, validation, or remediation intelligence is materially useful.
One bounded, sanitized representative dataset - exact fields agreed during scoping.
- 1-3 representative findings, attacks, campaigns, or attack chains
- Event, attack sequence, or trace
- Reproduction state
- Runtime observations where available
- Current framework or taxonomy mappings
- Remediation metadata where available
- Relevant target or system metadata
The pilot does not require the partner to expose its proprietary attack engine, model weights, prompts, attack corpus, or other unnecessary internal IP.
1. Normalize the partner evidence
Map the selected partner attack or finding representation into a bounded SecEng evidence contract while preserving source provenance.
2. Add gray-box context where available
Use selected SecEng Workbench capabilities to map additional context around the observed behavior.
3. Run APC path qualification
Use the combined supported evidence to build and independently challenge the attack-path representation.
4. Return the result to the partner
Map the resulting SecEng intelligence back into a structure the partner can ingest or render natively.
The objective is whether SecEng materially improves the partner's platform.
The objective is not to prove that SecEng can generate another security report.
Integration fit
A representative partner finding, trace, or attack object can enter the selected SecEng workflow and return structured output without requiring adoption of the aisecurity.llc UI.
Grounding integrity
Every APC grounded step retains traceable supporting evidence and an allowed evidence-to-technique relationship.
Inference discipline
Any unsupported earlier or later TTP step remains explicitly labeled as inferred or speculative and is never silently promoted to grounded evidence.
Independent validation
The validation layer can challenge weak grounding, ATT&CK mapping, sequence logic, or unsupported assumptions rather than merely repeating the original attack narrative.
Context uplift
Gray-box or structural context contributes at least one useful piece of attack-path, authority, reachability, or remediation information beyond the original attack result where such context is in scope.
Remediation uplift
The combined analysis can identify a meaningful control or boundary, or a cross-chain chokepoint, rather than merely restating individual finding fixes.
Product-native fit
At least one returned SecEng artifact can be represented, correlated, or acted on inside the partner's existing product data model.
Commercial fit
Both parties can identify the exact capability set, deployment boundary, support obligation, entitlement model, and license structure required for production.
Three pilot shapes
Pick the bounded integration pattern that best matches the platform's current maturity.
Attack-trace pilot
Observed partner attack trace or reproduced chain
Evidence normalization + APC
Platforms already producing strong behavioral evidence but wanting an independent grounding and validation layer.
Gray-box enrichment pilot
Partner attack evidence + source/system/agent/tool context
Code, authority, context analysis + APC
Platforms that normally operate black-box but can use deeper context when it increases signal.
Cross-chain remediation pilot
Multiple related partner findings or chains
APC correlation + remediation-chokepoint analysis
Platforms that already discover multiple attack paths and want to determine which control changes break the greatest number of them.
Preserve the partner's IP boundary.
An OEM evaluation should use the minimum information necessary to prove the integration.
- proprietary attacker model weights
- internal attack-generation prompts
- proprietary mutation strategy
- private attack corpus
- full partner source tree
- unrelated customer information
The partner attack engine remains encapsulated. SecEng's own internal prompts, validation logic, scoring internals, and engine implementation likewise remain encapsulated unless separately licensed.
Prove the delta first. Productize only what adds value.
The partner can keep the attack engine, UI, orchestration, reporting, and customer relationship while licensing only the modules that materially improve its product.
Scope
Select the representative attack workflow, initial SecEng capability set, required evidence or context, deployment boundary, and technical success criteria.
Pilot
Execute the bounded integration and compare the partner result alone versus the partner evidence plus selected SecEng capabilities.
Decide
License only the modules that produced material value. Possible examples include APC only, APC + Authority Graph, Code Scanner + APC, or a broader capability set.
Embed
Move the agreed capability set into the partner's production architecture under the selected OEM, embedded, co-branded, or white-label commercial model.
Expand
Add customer-org entitlement, additional capability modules, support tiers, or deeper integration as adoption grows.
The partner owns the product experience.
A successful pilot can convert into an OEM Embedded License for the selected SecEng Workbench capabilities.
Partner license, selected module entitlement, customer-org tracking, usage controls, redistribution rights, support and update entitlement, co-branding, white-label or private-label options, and private, local, offline, or air-gapped terms where supported.
Built for platforms that already attack, simulate, or validate.
The route should fit offensive-security platforms, AI red-team platforms, autonomous pentesting, breach-and-attack simulation, continuous validation, and adjacent adversarial-security products.
AI / Agent Red Team Platforms
Add code, authority, MCP, identity, and evidence-qualified attack-path context around adversarial AI findings.
Autonomous Offensive Security
Add independent path qualification and system context around machine-generated attack activity.
Breach & Attack Simulation
Use additional SecEng evidence and context to qualify meaningful paths and remediation breakpoints.
Continuous Security Validation
Turn recurring adversarial observations into evidence-linked attack-path and retest intelligence.
Adversarial Exposure Validation
Connect reproduced exposure to system context, path confidence, and remediation chokepoints.
Red-Team Automation
Add partner-native evidence qualification and structural context without replacing the red-team workflow.
Do not claim identical technical compatibility with every category. This section communicates potential fit, not guaranteed plug-and-play compatibility.
Choose only the SecEng capabilities that strengthen the platform.
Select the modules that increase evidence quality, grounding, validation, and remediation intelligence.
Attack Path Chaining (APC)
Evidence-grounded attack clusters, explicit inference boundaries, independent validation, ATT&CK mapping, and remediation chokepoints.
- Grounded core
- Precedent-backed extensions
- Independent validation
- Break the chain
SecEng Authority Graph
Map agents, identities, credentials, MCP servers, tools, permissions, approval gates, and external effects to add authority and blast-radius context.
- Authority relationships
- Delegated action paths
- Blast-radius context
SecEng Code Scanner
Find AI-native code and application paths across prompts, retrieval, models, agents, MCP, tools, data, and consequential actions.
- Source-to-sink paths
- AI-specific trust boundaries
- Structured findings
SecEng Adversarial Range
Replayable adversarial scenarios for prompt, RAG, agent, tool, workflow, and policy testing where complementary validation is useful.
- Replayable scenarios
- Behavioral failures
- Retest conditions
SecEng RAG Test Harness
Add retrieval authorization, tenant and corpus boundary, XPIA, and provenance testing where RAG paths contribute to the target system.
- Boundary tests
- Provenance checks
- XPIA evidence
What an APC-enabled integration can return
Use the APC output shapes that the implementation supports and the partner can ingest natively.
Evidence before claims.
SecEng should not make a partner's attack result sound stronger than the evidence supports.
Observed
Behavior directly reproduced or captured by the partner or another supported evidence source.
Grounded
Attack-path steps supported by system or company-specific evidence and an allowed ATT&CK mapping.
Inferred / speculative
Earlier or later path hypotheses supported by precedent and reachability reasoning but not directly established by the target evidence.
Validated
Machine validation has challenged grounding, mapping, sequencing, and unsupported assumptions.
Analyst-validated
Human review has explicitly approved the resulting claim where that status is part of the operating model.
Explore the adjacent partner routes.
Use the narrower specialization when the partner's commercial motion is different.
OEM Engine
Embed selected SecEng Workbench capabilities inside an existing security product or platform.
Scanner Providers
Add AI-native findings and optional APC enrichment to an existing scanner.
Technology Partners
Connect SecEng evidence and controls into broader AppSec, DevSecOps, GRC, cloud, and security workflows.
Attack Path Chaining
See the APC architecture, grounding model, validation stages, outputs, and claim boundaries.
Bring one representative attack. Measure what SecEng adds.
The fastest evaluation is a bounded pilot against evidence the partner already understands.
Primary CTA
Establish the input contract, add only the SecEng context required for the experiment, return the enriched result to the partner's workflow, and measure the delta.
Secondary CTA
Explore the APC architecture, grounding model, validation stages, outputs, and claim boundaries.
Bring your attack engine. Add another intelligence plane around the result.
Start with one bounded attack path, prove whether SecEng adds material value, and license only the capability set that improves the product.