Keep your offensive engine. Add system context behind the attack.
Bring one representative attack result, reproduced failure, campaign object, or runtime trace. Add approved application, code, agent, tool, identity, permission, workflow, and control context. Qualify which relationships explain the observed behavior, which continuations remain hypotheses, which paths are defensible, and which controls interrupt them—then return the result through the partner platform with its identity preserved.
Four things the pilot has to prove.
Observed behavior preserved
The partner's finding, attack, campaign, session, trace, reproduction state, and identity remain the primary source objects.
Connected context added
Add approved code, retrieval, agent, tool, identity, permission, authority, workflow, and control relationships only where they contribute useful signal.
Path state made explicit
Separate observed behavior, grounded relationships, inferred continuation, candidate paths, validated paths, reproduced paths, rejected paths, and residual paths.
Partner-native return
Return structured context, path state, evidence, chokepoints, remediation, and retest through the offensive platform.
HOW IT WORKS
More context behind the result. The same platform in front of the customer.
Your platform sends a structured attack or finding. The OEM Engine adds approved connected context, qualifies the path, and returns the result through your existing tools and workflow.
Observed Attack Round Trip
The partner supplies an attack object it already understands. The OEM Engine adds only the agreed Workbench context and qualification, then returns the enriched result to the same product and lifecycle.
Closed-loop diagram: a partner attack object passes through approved system context and independent qualification, then returns to the partner platform as a partner-native result. Updated attack, remediation, or retest state remains in the partner workflow.
- 1Partner attack objectAttack or campaign ID • Trace and observed result • Reproduction state • Existing evidence and mappings
- 2Approved system contextOptional architecture • Code and data paths • Agent and tool relationships • Identity, permission, and authority boundaries
- 3Independent qualificationGrounded evidence • Explicit inference • Sequence and precondition review • Shared remediation chokepoints
- 4Partner-native returnStable attack identity • Evidence references • Validation state • Remediation context and retest condition
The offensive platform remains the system of engagement. AI Security LLC contributes only the context and evidence intelligence that survives the comparison.
Optional path qualification: Attack Path Analysis can preserve grounded evidence, label inference, challenge weak path assumptions, and identify controls shared across several supported paths.
Bring one representative attack result. Measure what the connected analysis adds.
- Attack result or campaign
- Runtime trace or reproduced behavior
- Existing findings
- Optional approved system context
- Normalize the evidence
- Add approved connected context
- Qualify path state
- Challenge assumptions
- Identify remediation chokepoints
- Structured path-analysis result
- Evidence and provenance
- Observed, grounded, and inferred labels
- Validation and review state
- Remediation context
- Retest state
- Did connected context add material information?
- Did path qualification expose weak assumptions?
- Did the analysis improve remediation priority?
- Can the result live inside the partner product?
- Does the value justify productization?
Keep the attack identity. Add the structural explanation.
The useful result is not another finding that restates the observed behavior. It is the same attack object returned with additional evidence boundaries, system context, and a clearer control point.
- Attack ID
- ATTACK-DEMO-07
- Observed result
- Unsafe tool action reproduced
- Trace
- Interaction and runtime sequence retained
- Existing state
- Confirmed behavior
- Existing remediation
- Restrict the unsafe action
- Stable attack ID
- ATTACK-DEMO-07 preserved
- Grounded evidence
- Observed tool action and supporting trace
- System context
- The agent reached a consequential tool through a delegated permission path.
- Failed boundary
- The required approval step was absent before tool execution.
- Inference state
- One continuation hypothesis · explicitly labeled
- Remediation chokepoint
- Require approval and constrain permitted tool arguments.
- Retest condition
- Repeat the attack after the approval boundary is enforced.
Sanitized reference example. Exact fields depend on the partner contract and the context the partner authorizes for the pilot.
Built to sit behind the platform you already run.
Add the analysis your customers now expect, without touching the engine, brand, or workflow they already trust.
Your attack engine already does the hard part.
The partner already generates the attack activity, campaign, reproduced behavior, trace, or offensive finding. The Workbench should not duplicate that engine. It should add system context, evidence discipline, independent path qualification, and remediation intelligence where those additions produce material value.
- Findings
- Reproduced failures
- Campaign results
- Attack traces
- Runtime observations
- Session and target metadata
- Existing taxonomy mappings
- Current remediation state
- Application architecture
- Code-risk paths
- Prompts and retrieval
- Agent and tool relationships
- Identity and permission context
- Approval boundaries
- Data and trust relationships
- Consequential actions
- Existing controls
- Evidence grounding
- Explicit inference
- Sequence and precondition analysis
- Path state
- Relevant ATT&CK mapping
- Shared remediation chokepoints
- Retest conditions
- Analyst-review state
Preserve the partner's attack evidence.
A mature offensive platform may already generate attacks, reconstruct chains, retain traces, classify findings, recommend fixes, and support retesting. Analysis should be added only where it contributes information the existing result does not already contain.
- which attack or campaign ran
- the target and interaction sequence
- observed model, agent, or tool behavior
- whether unsafe behavior was reproduced
- the attack trace and reproduction state
- existing severity and framework mappings
- current remediation guidance
- runtime or campaign telemetry
- code or data paths behind the observed behavior
- agent, MCP, tool, identity, and permission relationships
- delegated-authority context
- failed approval or control boundaries
- explicit grounded-versus-inferred claim state
- independent challenge of sequence assumptions
- controls shared across several related paths
- structured evidence and retest conditions for partner-native return
Evidence-qualified paths
- Observed and grounded relationships
- Explicit hypotheses
- Validation and review state
- Relevant behavior mapping
- Remediation-chokepoint analysis
Find the route that matches your product.
A bounded, versioned contract for pilot evaluation.
Inspect the contract shape before sharing a native schema. Final fields, module support, transport, retention, and lifecycle behavior are agreed during pilot scoping.
1POST /v1/analysis2{3"integration_id": "your-platform",4"module": "attack_path_analysis",5"request_id": "req_01M9V...",6"finding": {7"id": "ATTACK-DEMO-07",8"type": "unsafe_tool_action",9"severity": "high",10"source": "your_platform"11},12"context": {13"target": "https://app.example.com",14"authenticated": true15}16}
Evidence-qualified attack paths, not a competing attack engine.
Attack Path Analysis reasons over supported partner evidence and approved connected context. It does not replace the attack engine, generate another offensive campaign, or silently strengthen the partner's claims.
Grounded where we know. Explicit where we infer.
Attack Path Analysis performs defensive analysis of supported paths. It does not generate exploit code, payloads, credential material, or step-by-step intrusion instructions.
Four layers, four questions.
- Generate attacks
- Adapt campaigns
- Execute scenarios
- Reproduce behavior
- Capture sessions and traces
- Produce offensive findings
- Map approved system context
- Add code-risk and authority relationships
- Preserve provenance
- Expose trust and approval boundaries
- Qualify path state
- Separate evidence from inference
- Challenge assumptions
- Identify related paths
- Rank remediation chokepoints
- Define retest state
- Render native UI
- Preserve customer workflow
- Own reporting
- Drive remediation
- Support regression
- Maintain account and commercial ownership
More context behind the result. The same platform in front of the customer.
Connected code-risk and authority context
Approved relationships behind prompts, RAG, agents, tools, data, and permissions.
Deeper authority mapping
Understand trust boundaries, delegation, approvals, and consequences.
Evidence you can act on
Structured evidence, replay, validation state, and retest conditions.
Partner-native return
Results returned through your issue systems, reports, and customer experience.
An offensive-platform pilot should prove identity, added value, and a clearer control point.
Prove the integration on one representative partner attack result.
Select one attack or campaign result the partner already understands well. Compare its current finding with the enriched return and determine whether the added system context, evidence boundary, or remediation chokepoint improves the product outcome. The supplied object does not need to already be a complete attack path.
- Findings
- Attack results
- Campaign objects
- Runtime traces
- Reproduced failures
- Candidate paths
- Existing taxonomy mappings
- Remediation records
- Relevant target or session metadata
- Representative source or configuration
- Agent definitions
- MCP or tool inventory
- Identities or service accounts
- Permissions and scopes
- Approval gates
- Retrieval topology
- Consequential actions or sinks
- One sanitized attack, trace, or campaign result
- Stable attack and session identifiers
- Existing evidence and remediation state
- Optional approved architecture, tool, identity, or permission context
- One technical reviewer
- Contract normalization
- Approved structural and authority analysis
- Evidence-grounding and inference labels
- Sequence and precondition challenge
- Remediation-chokepoint analysis
- Structured return object
- Input
- Observed partner trace or reproduced behavior
- Workbench
- Evidence normalization, connected context where approved, and path qualification
- Best for
- Platforms with strong behavioral evidence that want independent grounding and validation.
- Input
- Partner attack evidence plus selected system, source, agent, tool, identity, or permission context
- Workbench
- Code, authority, workflow, and path analysis
- Best for
- Platforms that usually operate black-box but can use deeper context for selected engagements.
- Input
- Multiple related partner findings, traces, campaigns, or paths
- Workbench
- Cross-path correlation and remediation-chokepoint analysis
- Best for
- Platforms seeking control-level prioritization beyond individual finding fixes.
The pilot does not require offensive model weights, attack-generation prompts, proprietary mutation logic, private attack corpora, unrestricted source access, or direct access to partner customers.
A pilot does not automatically create a production adapter, public compatibility claim, ongoing license, or unrestricted redistribution right.
What a path-analysis integration can return
Attack Path Analysis
Correlate partner evidence and approved context into candidate, supported, validated, reproduced, residual, or rejected paths while preserving evidence grounding, explicit inference, and remediation chokepoints.
Authority Graph
Add agents, identities, credentials, tools, permissions, approvals, and consequential actions to explain effective authority and blast radius.
Code Scanner
Add AI-specific code findings and code-risk paths across prompts, retrieval, models, agents, MCP, tools, data, outputs, and actions.
Adversarial Range
Run complementary bounded scenarios, replay supported conditions, and create regression evidence where the partner requires additional validation.
RAG Security Testing
Add retrieval-authorization, provenance, tenant-boundary, poisoning, and indirect-injection evidence where retrieval contributes to the observed behavior.
- Candidate, supported, validated, reproduced, residual, or rejected path state
- Related candidate paths
- Observed, derived, grounded, and inferred step labels
- Evidence provenance
- Relevant ATT&CK mappings
- MITRE Attack Flow export where supported
- ATT&CK Navigator export where supported
- Remediation chokepoints
- Retest conditions
- Machine-validation state
- Analyst-review state
- Partner-native structured result
Every path step carries an explicit state label.
Start small. Prove value. Scale with confidence.
A short, focused pilot proves real value in your workflow before production.
- 1
Pilot
One representative finding, one module, one acceptance decision.
- 2
Production
Scale modules, environments, and data boundaries.
- 3
Scale
Expand coverage, customers, and use cases with continuous improvement.
The partner retains its offensive engine, attack intelligence, models, campaigns, telemetry, UI, brand, account, and customer relationship. AI Security LLC retains its engines, canonical contracts, evidence logic, methods, and unrelated tooling. Neither side exposes proprietary internals beyond the bounded exchange required for the integration.
AI Security LLC does not contact, market to, or contract around the partner’s end customers unless explicitly authorized.
Exact pilot, implementation, deployment, support, and licensing terms depend on the selected capability, integration burden, customer scope, and rights requested.
Not quite the right fit?
Bring one representative attack result. Measure what the connected analysis adds.
Establish the input contract, preserve the partner object, add only the approved context required by the experiment, return the result through the partner workflow, and measure the explanatory, validation, remediation, and product value.
Keep the attack engine. Add connected context, explicit path state, and evidence-linked remediation behind it.