01
Authority
Document what the agent can see, decide, call, change, approve, and trigger across every connected system.
Tool-calling agents are not chatbot features. They are authority chains. This brief turns agent risk into concrete boundaries, approvals, monitoring, and recovery paths.
Audience
AI product teams, platform engineering, AppSec, workflow automation owners
Brief packet
4
authority boundaries
9
abuse paths
1
rollback plan
Signal
Agents can read context, call tools, mutate records, message users, browse, code, or trigger downstream workflows. Many designs grant action authority before proving boundaries, approvals, and recovery.
Control target
Authority / Boundary / Recovery
Evidence target
Agent authority graph and tool inventory
Claim posture
Agent security findings should be presented as tested workflow evidence, not generalized claims about every deployment.
Problem
Agents can read context, call tools, mutate records, message users, browse, code, or trigger downstream workflows. Many designs grant action authority before proving boundaries, approvals, and recovery.
Thesis
Agentic systems need a delegated-action security model: explicit authority, least-privilege tools, approval context, durable traces, misuse tests, and rollback paths.
Operating Model
01
Document what the agent can see, decide, call, change, approve, and trigger across every connected system.
02
Constrain tools with scoped credentials, tenant checks, policy gates, approval context, and blast-radius limits.
03
Capture enough evidence to reconstruct actions, reverse unsafe changes, notify owners, and improve regression tests.
Workstreams
Workstream 01
Map users, agent roles, tools, permissions, external systems, approval steps, and privileged actions.
Workstream 02
Test prompt injection, tool misuse, context poisoning, unsafe action paths, approval bypass, and cross-system escalation.
Workstream 03
Define what gets logged, how actions are replayed, who approves remediation, and how unsafe changes are reversed.
Deliverables
Agent authority graph and tool inventory
Delegated-action threat model
Prompt-injection and tool-abuse test suite
Approval and rollback control recommendations
Agent workflow evidence pack
Proof system
Proof previews
These are the publication artifacts this brief should point to in a real engagement.
Related paths
Deliverables produced
These are the sample publication artifacts buyers should inspect after reading the brief. They turn the brief into proof.
Caveat
Agent security findings should be presented as tested workflow evidence, not generalized claims about every deployment.